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Abstract. With the increasing popularity of the cloud, clients oursource
their data to clouds in order to take advantage of unlimited virtualized
storage space and the low management cost. Such trend prompts the
privately oursourcing computation, called multiparty cloud computation
(MCC): Given k clients storing their data in the cloud, how can they per-
form the joint functionality by contributing their private data as inputs,
and making use of cloud’s powerful computation capability. Namely, the
clients wish to oursource computation to the cloud together with their
private data stored in the cloud, which naturally happens when the com-
putation is involved with large datasets, e.g., to analyze malicious URLs.
We note that the MCC problem is different from widely considered con-
cepts, e.g., secure multiparty computation and multiparty computation
with server aid.
To address this problem, we introduce the notion of homomorphic thresh-
old proxy re-encryption schemes, which are encryption schemes that en-
joy three promising properties: proxy re-encryption – transforming en-
crypted data of one user to encrypted data of target user, threshold
decryption – decrypting encrypted data by combining secret key shares
obtained by a set of users, and homomorphic computation – evaluat-
ing functions on the encrypted data. To demonstrate the feasibility of
the proposed approach, we present an encryption scheme which allows
anyone to compute arbitrary many additions and at most one multipli-
cations.
1 Introduction
The concept of cloud computing has been widely accepted by individuals and
enterprises. It is getting more and more popular because ideally it can provide
unlimited computation capability and storage space by virtualizing vast physical
computer resources and integrating them together. Due to these advantages as
well as the low management cost, individuals and enterprises have been taking
actions to outsource to clouds their data and hopefully outsource computation,
which is still a challenging task which yet has not been well resolved in the
literature.
In the present paper, we consider the problem that clients (individuals or
enterprises) wish to oursource computation to the cloud together with their
private data stored in the cloud. More specifically, we consider the problem
formulated as follows:
Multiparity Cloud Computation(MCC) Consider that k clients, p1, · · · , pk,
store their data x1, · · · , xk in clouds in an encrypted form, they wish to cooperate
together in order to efficiently and securely compute the function f(x1, · · · , xk)
by utilizing the computation capability of clouds.
Here the terms of “efficiently” and “securely” pose some intuitive requirements
towards solving MCC problem:
1. The communication overhead between the clients and the cloud should be
minimized for the purpose of efficiency. It will rule out some trivial solu-
tions where the clients download their data from the cloud, decrypt them
to obtain the original data, and then adopt secure multiparty computation
protocols with cloud aid. Since downloading data from cloud will pose heavy
communication overhead, it dispels the benefit of the cloud. In addition, the
evaluation of functionalities should be performed in the cloud in order to
take advantage of cloud computation capability.
2. The data privacy should be preserved for the purpose of security, which has
three fold: (i) The data stored in the cloud should be kept privacy, namely the
data should be encrypted before outsourced to the cloud. (ii) The evaluation
result should be kept private from the cloud, (iii) each client can not learn
anything other the result of the evaluation f and the information revealed
by that.
While MCC problem is quite similar to multiparty computation (MPC) prob-
lem [8] at first glance, indeed it is different from that. As in the multiparty
computation problem, the inputs of the evaluation reside at the client side.
Moreover, the evaluation will be performed by the clients themselves, rather
than by the cloud in the case of MCC. Those two distinctions make the MCC
more difficult than MPC because of the efficiency demand and the privacy issue
stated as above. More information about MPC can be referred to [7].
Another related problem is secure multiparty computation with server aid,
which was recently introduced in [5]. The secure multiparty computation with
server aid can be regarded as a bridge between the gap MCC and MPC because
the inputs of the evaluation are still stored locally similar to MPC but the
evaluation will be performed in the cloud analogous to MCC.
Applications Among many others, here we present two applications about
multiparty cloud computation.
1. Malicious URLs Detection: In order to automatically detect malicious URLs,
the researcher may propose a complicated model which involved many fea-
tures distilled from large dataset, e.g. malicious URL samples and web page
pointed by the URLs. To make the model more accurate, the detection model
should be trained with a mass of data from many anti-virus companies. How-
ever, these companies store the data in the cloud for the sake of economy
and are unwilling to share the data directly to the researchers. Therefore, the
researcher has to outsource the evaluation (detection model) to the cloud,
so that the cloud could perform the evaluation by taking as inputs the data
from companies.
2. Healthcare Information Query: Healthcare service providers (hospitals) main-
tain their patient records and now would outsource these databases to the
cloud. They may encrypt the database in order to preserve patient privacy
in order to comply with some regulations. Some research group tries to es-
timate the trend of certain disease by analyzing the symptoms from a large
number of patients. The hospitals are reluctant to share their databases with
the research group, but only allow the group to perform evaluation on top of
their data. Hence, the research group has to describe their estimation model
and let the cloud perform the model instead.
2 Model Formulation
System Model We consider three types of entities in our model: a third party,
a service provider providing service in the cloud, and many clients making use
of cloud service. Typically, the service provider may not be the cloud vendor,
although we refer them as the cloud in short here. The third party is indepen-
dent from the clients and the cloud, and responsible for key management when
considering the cryptographic primitives.
The clients not only outsource their data to the cloud, but also outsource
the computation functions, which can be any models to analyze or estimate the
data. The cloud hosts the data owned by clients in a isolated manner – individual
clients’ data are separated from each other, and the cloud provides certain level of
reliability, e.g., satisfying some SLA agreed with clients. The cloud will evaluate
the functions for the client and eventually the clients learn the result but the
cloud does not learn anything from that. We further assume there exists a secure
and authenticated communication channel between any two entities.
Adversarial Model The security threat originates from the misbehavior of
the clients and the cloud. We consider a computationally bounded adversary
model – semi-honest but curious model, which specifies the behaviors of the
clients and the cloud. Specifically:
1. The clients and the cloud execute the protocol’s specification exactly;
2. The cloud provides reliable storage service, namely it does not modify or
destroy the stored data;
3. The inputs of the function are provided appropriately. Some techniques, e.g
keyword search, can be adopted to facilitate the cloud to prepare dataset for
the function.
4. The cloud is curious and makes great effort to infer something from the
execution;
5. While the client may be reluctant to leak any information related to its own
data stored in the cloud, it is desire to learn information from other clients’s
dataset.
We also emphasize that the third party is fully trusted. The trusted third
party will be responsible for issuing keys, and managing key distribution as
needed.
3 Homomorphic Threshold Proxy Re-Encryption Scheme
In order to preserve privacy, the clients will encrypt their data when they out-
source it to the cloud. However, the encrypted form of data greatly impedes the
utilization due to its randomness. Many efforts have been done for the purpose of
data usage but without undermining the data privacy. Homomorphic encryption
has been one of critical techniques to achieve this objective and can be found
in volumes of research work [3,4,6,1,2]. However, simply adopting the homomor-
phic encryption does not work in MCC because of the fact that homomorphic
encryption scheme only could perform homomorphism evaluation in the case of
ciphertexts under the same public/private keys. In MCC the inputs of the func-
tions are from multiple clients with their own public/private key, which prohibits
adopting homomorphic encryption schemes directly. Hence, this inspires us to
introduce the proxy re-encryption capability into the homomorphic encryption
schemes.
In practice, we propose the homomorphic threshold proxy re-encryption schemes
with desirable properties:
– Homomorphism: Given two ciphertexts c1 and c2 on plaintexts m1 and m2
respectively, one can obtain the ciphertext on the plaintext m1+m2 and/or
m1 ·m2 by evaluating c1 and c2 without decrypting ciphertexts.
– Proxy re-encryption: Given a proxy re-encryption key, the proxy can trans-
form a ciphertext of one user to a ciphertext of the target user.
– Threshold decryption: By dividing the private key into several pieces of secret
shares, all clients can work together to decrypt the ciphertext – the output
of the function.
3.1 Scheme Definition
Definition 1. (homomorphic threshold proxy re-encryption) A homomorphic
threshold proxy re-encryption scheme, denoted by Λ, consists of the polynomial-
time algorithms as follows:
Setup(1ℓ): Given security parameter 1ℓ, this algorithm outputs the global pa-
rameter param, which includes the specification of message space, plaintext
space, and ciphertext space. We assume that param is implicitly included as
input in the following algorithms.
Keygen: This algorithm generates a public/private key pair (pki, ski) for client
i.
ThresholdKeygen(k): Here k is the expected number of secret shares. This
algorithm generates a pair of public/private key, and divides the private key
into k shares, with which k clients together can decrypt a ciphertext encrypted
with the corresponding public key. We denote the public/private keys denoted
as (spk, ssk), where ssk = {ssk1, · · · , sskk}. We name (spk, ssk) will be
the target public/private key.
ProxyKeygen(ski, spk): This algorithm allows client i to generate pa roxy
re-encryption key rki by taking as inputs its private key ski and the target
public key spk, such that the proxy can re-encrypt a ciphertext under pki to
a ciphertext under spk.
Enc(M, pki): Given the message M and public key pki, this algorithm encrypts
M and outputs ciphertext C.
ProxyEnc(C,rki): Given ciphertext C under public key pki and a re-encryption
key rki, this algorithm will output ciphertext C
′ under public key spk via
re-encrypting C.
HomoEval({C′1, . . . , C
′
k}, spk, f): Given a set of ciphertext C
′
1, . . . , C
′
k under
the public key spk, corresponding to the messages m1, . . . ,mk, this algorithm
generates ciphertext C′h, such that C
′
h = Enc(f(m1, . . . ,mk), spk).
Decrypt(C, ski): Given ciphertext C under public key pki, this algorithm de-
crypts the message m from C with private key ski.
ThresholdDec(C′h, ssk = {ssk1, . . . , sskk}): Given ciphertext C
′
h under pub-
lic key spk, this algorithm decrypts the message m from C′h with the coop-
eration of k clients holding secret share sski, 1 ≤ i ≤ k, respectively.
3.2 MCC Protocol
With the the homomorphic threshold proxy re-encryption scheme Λ defined as
above, we can construct protocol to solveMCC problem. Let {(P1,M1), . . . , (Pk,Mk)}
be the set of pairs of clients and its own data involved in the MCC problem.
Note that Mi will be outsourced to the cloud in an encrypted form. Note that
we assume all clients and the trusted third party share the common parameter
generated by Λ.Setup.
Setup Phase:
– The trusted third party invokes Λ.Setup and initializes the public parameter
of Λ, which will be shared by all clients.
– Client i invokes Λ.Keygen and generates public/private key pair (pki, ski)
– Client i encrypts its data Mi with the public key pki, obtains Ci, and then
outsources Ci to the cloud.
Preparation Phase:
– The trusted third party invokes Λ.ThresholdKeygen and obtains a pair
of public/private key (spk, {ssk1, · · · , sskk}). It publishes the public key
spk and distributes the share of private key sski to the client i through a
secure channel, assuming there has k clients contributing their data.
– Client i(1 ≤ i ≤ k) invokes Λ.ProxyKeygen by taking as inputs ski and
spk, and generates a proxy re-key rki. Then client i sends rki to the cloud.
– The cloud invokes Λ.ProxyEnc by taking as inputs ciphertext Ci and rki
(1 ≤ i ≤ k). The ciphertext output by Λ.ProxyEnc is denoted by C′i.
Evaluation Phase:
– The cloud invokes Λ.HomoEval by evaluating function f with the inputs
C′1, · · · , C
′
k and outputs a result output.
Decryption Phase:
– k clients invoke Λ.ThresholdDec with their owned secret shares of pri-
vate key ssk1, · · · , sskk and output, so that they will obtain the result of
f(M1, · · · ,Mk).
3.3 A Homomorphic Threshold Proxy Re-encryption scheme
To demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed encryption scheme, we present
a such scheme, which allows the cloud to compute arbitrarily many multiplica-
tions with the ciphertexts under the target public/private keys.
– Setup(1ℓ,): Let p be a ℓ−bit prime, and let G,GT be two cyclic groups of
order p. Let e be a bilinear group, e : G×G→ GT . Let g be the generator
randomly selected from the group G, and Z = e(g, g). The message space is
GT .
– Keygen(i): Client i selects αi from Z
∗
p uniformly at random so that its
public key will be pki = g
αi and the private key ski = αi.
– ThresholdKeygen: The trusted third party selects α0 from Z
∗
p uniformly
at random. Let spk = gα0 and ssk = {ssk1, · · · , sskk}, which is generated as
follows: let s(x) =
∑i=k
i=0 bix
i, where b0 = 1/α0 and bi(1 ≤ i ≤ k) are selected
from {1, · · · , p − 1} uniformly at random. let sski = (i, s(i)). Without loss
of generality, we assume k ≥ 2.
– ProxyKeygen(αi, spk): Given clienti’s private key ski = αi and the target
public key spk = gα0 published by the third party, client i generates the
proxy re-key rki = spk
1/αi .
– Enc: Given message Mi ∈ GT , client i selects ri from Z
∗
p uniformly at
random and generates ciphertext Di = (Ci1, Ci2) as:
Ci1 = pk
ri
i , Ci2 = Z
riMi
– ProxyEnc: Given the ciphertext (Ci1, Ci2) under the public key pki and
a re-encryption key rki = spk
1/αi , the proxy transforms the ciphertext to
(C′i1, C
′
i2) by:
C′i1 = e(Ci1,rki) = e(Ci1, spk
1/αi), C′i2 = Ci2
– HomoEval((C′11, C
′
12), (C
′
21, C
′
22), spk): Given two ciphertext (C
′
11, C
′
12), (C
′
21, C
′
22)
corresponding to the messages M1,M2 respectively, the ciphertext of the
multiplication of M1 ·M2 is (C
′
1, C
′
2), where
C′1 = C
′
11 · C
′
21, C
′
2 = C
′
12 · C
′
22
– Decrypt: Given the ciphertext (Ci1, Ci2) under the public key pki, client i
decrypts it as follows:
Mi = Ci2/e(Ci1, g
1/αi) = ZriM/Zri
– ThresholdDec: Given the ciphertext (C′1, C
′
2) under the target public key
spk, the decryption can be done with the cooperations of k clients:
for client i, it computes
wi = C
′s(i)
1 ,
and sends wi to all other clients, and then each client decrypts the ciphertext
as
M = C′2/
i=k∏
i=1
(wi)
λi ,
where
λi =
j=k,j 6=i∏
j=1
j
j − i
4 Conclusion
We initialize the study of multiparty cloud computing, where the cloud provides
both storage service and computation service. The main goal is to enable many
clients, by leveraging the cloud capability, to perform outsourced computation
function in a secure and private manner. We propose the notion of homomorphic
threshold proxy re-encryption scheme. Our ongoing work includes the construc-
tion of a fully (or somewhat) homomorphic threshold proxy re-encryption scheme
and its security analysis.
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